Introduction

International sanctions against North Korea―imposed in response to its nuclear tests and missile launches―were most rigorously enforced in 2016 and 2017. It has now been more than eight years since these measures began to significantly constrain the country’s foreign trade, making them a structural feature of North Korea’s external economic environment.

Roughly three years after the full-scale sanctions took effect, the COVID-19 pandemic further deepened the country’s isolation. In an effort to prevent the spread of the virus, North Korean authorities sealed the country’s land borders for more than two years, leading to a sharp decline in trade volumes. Since the second half of 2022, however, the gradual resumption of cross-border rail freight has supported a slow but steady recovery―one that has continued through 2024.

In 2024, North Korea’s trade with China largely followed the trends observed in 2023. Exports continued to rise, while imports declined, resulting in a modest decrease in overall trade volume. The country’s main exports―processing-on-commission goods such as wigs, which are not subject to sanctions, and minerals―have seen little change since the border reopened.

More notable shifts occurred in the composition of imports. While imports of intermediate goods essential for industrial production remained stable, imports of certain consumer goods―such as rice, sugar, and tobacco―declined, likely due to import substitution through increased domestic production or alternative sourcing from Russia.

Until mid-2023, North Korea’s external economic activity was almost entirely shaped by its trade with China. From the latter half of the year, however, deepening ties with Russia began to exert a more discernible influence. Facing mounting shortages of military supplies due to its protracted war, Russia reportedly sought assistance from North Korea. By late 2023, this cooperation began to materialize more concretely. While direct confirmation remains scarce, satellite imagery and other indirect evidence suggest that North Korean arms may have been supplied to Russia. Additional reports point to the possible deployment of North Korean troops, with some allegedly sustaining casualties. There is also credible evidence that Russia violated UN sanctions by providing refined petroleum products to North Korea. Although the scale of Russia-North Korea trade likely remains smaller than trade with China, the increased volume may have partially offset the decline in China-North Korea trade, leaving total external trade in 2024 roughly on par with the previous year.

Since the closure of its borders during the COVID-19 pandemic, North Korea has steadily advanced a policy of heightened state control, a trend that became increasingly evident in its external economic activities in 2024. Under revised trade regulations―requiring trading companies to report transaction items and volumes to the authorities―a substantial portion of foreign trade now appears to operate under direct state oversight. Even informal trade, which has regained momentum since the partial reopening of the border, seems to be occurring under government coordination.

This marks a notable departure from the pre-pandemic period, when relatively greater autonomy in foreign trade was granted to donju (private entrepreneurs) and regional trading companies. Multiple indicators suggest that these semi-autonomous spaces have been significantly curtailed, replaced by a system of centralized control. This shift mirrors other post-pandemic state-led initiatives aimed at consolidating control over foreign exchange and private capital, such as prohibitions on the use of foreign currencies in local markets, and persistent distortions in the exchange rate. Together, these measures appear designed to absorb foreign currency held by the population and reassert state authority over the country’s economic lifelines.

This chapter evaluates North Korea’s foreign economic performance in 2024 and provides an outlook for the future. In doing so, it expands beyond the traditional focus on China-North Korea trade to also consider emerging economic ties with Russia. China-North Korea official trade flows are analyzed using Chinese customs data, assessing overall trends and key commodity categories to shed light on North Korea’s broader economic conditions. Because reliable statistics are not available for unofficial China-North Korea trade or Russia-North Korea cooperation, this study also draws on media reports and other open sources to fill these information gaps.

* This article is part of 2024/2025 The DPRK Economic Outlook

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