KDI - Korea Development Institute - RESEARCH - Research Areas

Summary

Policy Study KOR A Study on the Superior Bargaining Position of Digital Platforms

This report analyzes the superior bargaining position of digital platform companies and their exploitation of this advantage. Two key characteristics underpin this position: (i) their advanced capacity for data collection and utilization compared to traditional firms, and (ii) their role as rule-setters within the marketplaces they have established.

Existing literature identifies three primary sources of their bargaining power: (i) information asymmetry, (ii) demand-side monopoly power, and (iii) hold-up arising from relationship-specific investments. Due to their superior data collection and utilization capabilities, platform firms are better positioned than traditional firms to exploit information asymmetry, thereby abusing their bargaining position. Additionally, the dynamic nature of platform markets often magnifies demand-side monopoly power. Despite a small market share, platforms can still exert significant market influence depending on user behavior. However, hold-up concerns over relationship-specific investments are less pronounced because platforms, which typically offer standardized terms of trade, find it challenging to enforce customized contract terms tailored to individual business users. Under customized contracts, the likelihood and severity of exploitation through hold-ups become most acute.

Theoretical model analysis reveals that platform firms may have incentives to refrain from using even the information they have acquired to capitalize on their superior bargaining position. Regarding relationship-specific investments, the inability to adopt customized contracts can encourage business users to invest despite the absence of a binding commitment mechanism―in sharp contrast with existing studies on relationship-specific investments and investment delays.

In concludion, this analysis highlights several critical issues that must be addressed to improve the short-term effectiveness and long-term consistency of regulatory measures targeting the abuse of superior bargaining positions by platform firms. First, discussions are needed on victim identification and the impact on the trade order. Current legal precedents requiring the identification of specific victims could hinder efforts to regulate the abuse of superior bargaining positions by platforms. For platforms that set rules for a wide range of counterparties, mandating counterparty specification could significantly limit the regulatory scope for addressing the abuse of superior bargaining positions. In the short term, therefore, it is advisable to alleviate the burden of identifying specific counterparties while still requiring evidence of adverse impacts on the trade oreder, consistent with the Geumbo Development precedent. Moreover, given the multi-sidedness of digital platforms, it is important to consider efficiency-enhancing or pro-competitive effects that may arise in adjacent markets or on the opposite side of the platform when examining instances of superior bargaining position abuse. In the long term, it would be preferable to transition toward regulation through competition law enforcement, such as addressing abuses of market-dominant positions. Acts that harm the trade order against unspecified counterparties are inherently subject to competition law. However, the current reliance on market share as a proxy for market dominance should be replaced by direct measure of market power, and legislative reforms, such as amendments to presumptive provisions, may also be necessary. Finally, to deter and promptly detect abuses of superior bargaining positions by platforms, it is essential to establish a dedicated, permanent oversight bodyendowed with the authority to access data or algorithms as needed.

Summary

Policy Study KOR Anticompetitive Practices of Online Platforms: Focusing on App Stores

As economic and daily activities increasingly shift to mobile platforms, concerns are mounting over the excessive influence of platforms that play a central role in the mobile ecosystem. In particular, app stores, primary channels for distributing apps that enable online access via mobile devices, draw significant scrutiny from competition authorities, as platform dominance in the mobile operating systems (OS) market directly transfers to this market.

This study examines recent global regulatory trends concerning the app store market, identifying key anticompetitive practices by app store platforms: monopolization of app distribution, forcing proprietary payment systems, and self-preferencing. Among these, self-preferencing manifests in various forms and occurs when platforms enter adjacent markets they mediate, competing with business users. Thus, one of the critical issues in regulating the app store market is the entry of app store platforms into their own app stores and its implications.

Against this backdrop, the study focuses on analyzing issues related to platform entry into their own app stores. Theoretically, such an entry can have positive and negative impacts, necessitating empirical analysis. A comparative review of prior empirical studies on the app store platforms of Google and Apple reveals mixed effects on competing app developers’ innovation, varying by platform and app in question.

Given the challenge of defining an app market revealed by prior studies, this study conducts further empirical analysis using detailed app classification criteria from data.ai. This approach enables a more granular market definition and examination of multiple platform entry cases. Analysis of 16 Apple app launches, using data on apps available for download in the Korean App Store, finds the impact on competing developers’ innovation inconclusive. The effects likely vary by the platform app’s characteristics, the entered market’s competitive dynamics, and whether anticompetitive behaviors occur post-entry, yet further pathway analysis is needed.

While not providing direct policy implications, this study offers empirical evidence to inform app store market competition policies. Literature and this study’s findings suggest platform entry into app markets may yield positive effects, rendering blanket bans on platforms selling their own apps to prevent self-preferencing inadvisable. Recent competition authority actions targeting self-preferencing have spurred arguments against prohibiting proprietary app sales; however, such sales must be strictly distinguished from self-preferencing practices.

Summary

Research Monograph KOR Empirical Study on the Growth of Korea’s Cultural Content Industry and Policy Implications

This study conducts a comprehensive analysis of the growth dynamics of South Korea's cultural content industry to enhance its competitiveness and support sustainable development. Employing a multifaceted empirical approach, it examines quantitative metrics―such as the number of businesses, employment levels, revenue, and trade flows―across the industry and its subsectors to identify growth trajectories and structural characteristics (Chapters 3 and 4).

Given the industry's complex interdependence with other sectors, this study combines data from the "Special Classification of the Content Industry" (Statistics Korea, Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism), the "Korean Standard Industrial Classification (KSIC)" (Statistics Korea), and the "Input-Output Tables" (Bank of Korea). This integration creates a new input-output table that captures 12 subsectors of the cultural content industry (Chapter 5).

The study uses the new input-output table to examine supply, demand, and input structures to illuminate the industry's economic roles and inter-industry linkages. Key metrics―including total output ratio, import dependency, intermediate input structure, and value-added ratio―are compared with other sectors to highlight the distinctive characteristics (Chapter 6). The study further investigates the sector's effects on the broader economy, calculating coefficients for input, production induction, and sensitivity, assessing the sector's overall impact via inter-industry ties and interactions (Chapter 7).

In recognition that individual businesses drive the industry's growth, this study identifies business growth enablers within the CPND framework (Content, Platform, Network, and Device). They include intellectual property ownership, workforce size, operational tenure, market diversification, and digital infrastructure. This analysis highlights the critical impact of IP rights―especially utility patents and copyrights―on competitiveness and revenue growth (Chapter 8).

Moreover, the study systematically evaluates relevant policies through a descriptive statistical analysis of 149 support programs managed by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism and the Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA), focusing on their primary functions and target groups (Chapter 9). Finally, building on the study's findings, key policy directions are proposed: fostering digital adaptability among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), enhancing IP protection in the digital era, diversifying export markets, and addressing regional disparities to ensure balanced development across Korea (Chapters 10).

Summary

KDI FOCUS The Ascent of K-Content: Industry Structure and Growth Drivers

Korea’s cultural content industry has seen rapid growth. Key drivers include improved content quality, a maturing digital ecosystem, and increasingly interconnected business networks. As the industry takes on a more prominent role in the national economy―generating a significant production inducement effect―policy efforts should focus on strengthening copyright protection and enforcement, advancing digital transformation among small and midsize firms, and diversifying export markets through deeper industry linkages.

- This paper analyzes the structural changes and growth trajectory of Korea’s content industry, assesses its economic impact, and identifies key drivers of firm-level growth.

- The industry composition is shifting toward digital content production and online distribution.

- Knowledge information has been the largest contributor to sales growth in the content industry.

- Content exports reached $12.45 billion in 2021, continuing a streak of record highs since data collection began.

- Rising domestic production capacity and declining reliance on foreign content have boosted net exports of K-content, contributing to a surplus in intellectual property trade.

- The content industry shows higher self-input coefficients than most service industries and even some manufacturing industries.

- The content industry has grown through close integration with the diverse industries comprising the CPND value chain.

- One unit increase in final demand in the content industry generates 1.572 units of output across all industries―64% within and 36% in other sectors.

- In 2020, the total production inducement effect of the content industry amounted to 113.7 trillion won.

- The content industry’s power dispersion index ranks 19th of 33, placing it in the mid-range.

- The content industry demonstrates aboveaverage sensitivity, highlighting the need for industrial and policy responses to external market changes.

- K-content has solidified its position in global markets through high production quality and artistic merit.

- Changes in CPND factors can also significantly influence the growth of content firms.

- Copyrights increase firm revenue by 11.6%, playing a key role in revenue generation by protecting creative works.

- Development of platforms, networks, and digital devices has also contributed significantly to growth in the content industry.

- Expanding sales channels improves market access and exposure to diverse customer segments. Overseas expansion helps broaden the consumer base and stabilize firm revenue.

- Engagements with content firms generate over twice the revenue growth compared to noncontent firms.

- Copyright acquisition and protection should be embedded across the entire support system for content firms.

- Promoting digital transformation―paired with measures to enhance adaptability―can help steer policy in a more strategic direction for small and midsize content firms.

- The government should systematically develop region-specific entry strategies through the K-Content Export Council.

Summary

Policy Study KOR CBDC-based New Banking System, Bank Runs, and Efficient Allocation

Digital financial innovation drives the development of the financial industry, offering new benefits to financial consumers. However, as demonstrated by the 2023 bank run involving Silicon Valley Bank, it also heightens the risk of digital bank runs. In exploring how to prevent bank runs while ensuring the efficiency of financial intermediation, this study examines a new banking system proposed in Europe, the CBDC next-level model: A central bank issues retail Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) to monopolize demand deposit-taking and supply these funds as pass-through funding to commercial banks. In turn, banks provide loans to private borrowers using these funds. This system removes barriers to entry in the loan market to allow for free competition among commercial banks, fintechs, and Big Tech companies, thereby introducing perfect competition. Rigorous theoretical analysis in this study shows that this novel system could eliminate bank runs while achieving socially optimal levels of financial intermediation. Nonetheless, this model also presents some limitations, such as the centralization of personal information by the central bank and the potential political influence over lending decisions.

Summary

KDI FOCUS Path to National Champions: Transforming Support Policies for Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs)

South Korea’s ‘national champion policy,’ designed to foster global enterprises, has yet to deliver measurable outcomes in sales and productivity, suggesting inefficiencies in resource allocation linked to ‘the risk of picking winners.’ Accordingly, the incentive structure of growth policies for Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMEs) needs an operational shift, moving away from conventional subsidy assistance toward a bespoke model that integrates private investment, consulting, and networks to address their business challenges collaboratively. Furthermore, in order to enhance policy accountability and effectiveness, it is crucial to consolidate support details and performance outcomes while ensuring transparency through public disclosure.

- Amid intensifying competition for technological dominance, advanced countries are stepping up the reintroduction of targeted industrial policy to concentrate support in specific industries or firms.

- Korea provides substantial subsidies to firms through its national champion policy, but studies on its effectiveness remain limited.

- This study analyzes the effectiveness of Korea’s national champion policy and offers recommendations for improvement by comparing its operational approach with those of other countries.

- Korea’s flagship national champion policy program, World Class 300, provided targeted annual subsidies to 30~56 firms selected through a government-led process.

- The declining share of high-growth firms led to a large drop in the number of firms satisfying WC300’s sales growth criterion, making it harder to identify eligible firms.

- An analysis of WC300 outcomes reveals no significant impact on sales, value-added, or productivity, suggesting that resources may have been allocated to firms misaligned with the project’s objectives.

- Korea’s national champion policy aims to foster innovation and promote exports among SMEs to drive growth and job creation.

- However, concentrating resources on less competitive firms through selective support risks undermining economic efficiency and distorting market dynamics.

- Relational support is likely more effective than transactional support for high-potential firms.

- Effective business growth support requires tailored assistance that meets the diverse needs across the growth stages of individual firms rather than focusing on a single activity.

- The time has come for Korea to shift gears in its national champion

- To enhance the effectiveness of the national champion policy, its framework―including firm selection and support measures―should transition to a private-sector-led approach.

- Enhancing policy accountability and effectiveness requires centralized management of support details and performance data alongside transparent public disclosure.

- Given the low incentives for actively restructuring government support projects, institutionalizing independent evaluations is crucial for improving future outcomes.

- New policy initiatives should operate systematic pilot programs to enhance effectiveness.

Summary

Policy Study KOR Analysis of Unfair Trade Factors in Agency Deals

Enacted in 2015, the Fair Agency Transactions Act of South Korea mandates annual written fact-finding investigations of agency transactions. Per this mandate, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) has conducted agency deal surveys since 2017 to identify unfair trade practices in agency transactions, with results disclosed through press releases. However, KFTC’s investigations do not deal with specific instances of unfair trade conditions. This study aims to determine factors contributing to unfair trade in agency transactions based on these survey results, focusing on the cosmetics sector as investigated in the 2021 fact-finding survey. Dissatisfaction with transactions serves as an indicator of the existence of unfair trade practices.

This study first investigates the factors influencing supplier dissatisfaction. Findings indicate that suppliers are more likely to be satisfied if they are market leaders with a significant market share and less dependent on the agency channel for transactions. This suggests that supplier satisfaction in agency deals decreases with lower market share or higher reliance on agents. These results are connected to the concept of bargaining power, implying that suppliers with greater negotiating power face fewer challenges when negotiating with agents. The study also examines the factors that influence agent dissatisfaction. Conditions frequently leading to unfair trade in agency transactions include the lack of a defined sales territory, diversification of supplier distribution channels (e.i., online), and shorter contract cycles.
However, this study finds the impact of contracts granting exclusive rights to suppliers and agents is inconclusive. While exclusive agents experience a greater variety of unfair trade, there is no higher likelihood of dissatisfaction with their transactions. This suggests that exclusive agency agreements foster a greater dependence on suppliers, which can lead to a higher likelihood of encountering unfair trade, but may also result in increased satisfaction due to more consistent transactions.

All these results have several implications. To enhance the effectiveness of KFTC’s surveys, it is essential to analyze unfair trade practices specific to each industry, which can improve KFTC’s monitoring functions. Additionally, including open-ended questions rather than solely relying on closed-ended ones is crucial, as agency transactions entail a myriad of scenarios that are difficult to capture accurately with quantitative queries alone. To reduce the burden on respondents and improve efficiency, KFTC should consider incorporating narrative questions into the survey design and streamlining the questionnaires through a thorough evaluation.

Summary

KDI FOCUS Protecting Customer Funds for Emerging Financial Products

Emerging financial products driven by innovation, such as virtual assets and simplified payment services, introduce both new conveniences and in-transaction risks to customer funds. Despite regulations on segregating customer funds already in place, full compliance by businesses with these rules is unlikely, especially with insolvency on their horizon. This paper proposes a new protection framework that bolsters the safety of new financial products and reduces funding pressures for the compensation scheme.

- New financial products emerging through innovation offer novel benefits but may also expose customers to risks in managing their funds.

- A protection system for emerging financial products can lay a strong foundation, serving as a key safety net to support reliable financial innovation.

- Customer funds for new financial products include prepaid balances, virtual asset deposits,

- P2P lending deposits, and funeral service prepayments.

- The current volume of customer funds associated with new financial products is substantial, at about 18 trillion won, and is expected to grow further, driven by advancements in digital finance and population aging.

- There have been numerous cases where businesses misappropriated customer funds for new financial products and later went bankrupt.

- Although fund segregation regulations for customer funds are in place, firms on the verge of bankruptcy are highly likely to violate them, and several other limitations persist.

- While fund segregation regulations serve a preventive function, the best of such precautions cannot eliminate all incidents, necessitating a post-incident protection system.

- In the direct protection scheme, firms pay insurance premiums in advance, and KDIC protects customers in the event of business insolvency.

- However, the direct scheme applies uniform insurance rates regardless of fund segregation in contrast to the fundamental insurance principle of premiums proportional to risk.

- In the indirect framework, firms do not pay insurance premiums, and KDIC safeguards only the funds segregated in banks in the event of bank failure.

- The indirect approach only protects segregated funds, leaving customers unprotected from violations of segregation rules, resulting in reduced protection effectiveness.

- The proposed hybrid scheme indirectly protects customer funds segregated in banks while directly safeguarding all other customer funds.

- This hybrid protection system ensures high effectiveness by safeguarding all customer funds and keeps

- insurance premium burdens low for firms and customers, as firms are incentivized to deposit most customer funds in banks.

- The hybrid protection system addresses risk transfer, in which a bank’s failure can trigger a firm’s insolvency.

- Early detection of firms facing liquidity risks is enabled by the hybrid proposal.

- KDIC’s burden under the hybrid option is not expected to be substantial.

- While the indirect protection system is easy to implement, the hybrid option requires substantial changes to the existing framework, making immediate implementation challenging.

- Recently, major developed countries have expanded the coverage of deposit insurance institutions beyond traditional deposits to include a wide range of financial and quasifinancial services, aiming to responsibly foster financial innovation.

- This study builds on such global trends to propose protection measures for customer funds in new financial products.

- The proposed protection system, with its inclusive nature, can serve as a comprehensive framework to protect and foster future innovation by capturing new financial products within its regulatory scope.

Summary

Research Monograph KOR Competition Policy in the Digital Platform Economy

Digital platforms have boosted consumer welfare and driven innovation and competition by integrating diverse technological advancements. These online platforms facilitate easier business transactions, instant information and content sharing, and the introduction of new products and services. However, as economic agents increasingly depend on them, concerns are growing about the excessive concentration of economic power in a limited number of platforms. As a result, in the past few years, competition policy related to digital platforms has gained more attention, prompting vigorous discussions for improvement.

Globally, competition authorities have conducted numerous investigations, and there have been several lawsuits regarding the abuse of market power by digital platforms, along with active merger reviews. In addition, major jurisdictions, including Germany, the EU, and the US, have taken legislative actions to bolster regulations over their market dominance outside the purview of current competition or antitrust law. This policy shift stems from recognizing the limitations of existing competition policies, as enforcing such laws against the anti-competitive behaviors of digital platforms becomes increasingly challenging, and there is criticism about the asynchronicity in ex-post regulatory approaches.

Against this backdrop, this report puts forth directions for competition policy reform to effectively address anti-competitive behavior by digital platform firms. The focus is on the abuse of market power and mergers that contributed to acquiring and strengthening their dominance. This report consists of four chapters as follows. The first two chapters deal with the unilateral conduct of digital platforms. Chapter 1 analyzes self-preferencing practices resulting from their dual roles, drawing out appropriate regulatory improvement measures based on their categorization, a review of their economic effects, and empirical analysis results. Chapter 2 examines the issue of platform fees, which has become a significant social concern. While exploring desirable approaches, this chapter assesses whether this issue can be viewed from the perspective of price abuse whenhigh platform fees areproblematic by reviewing price abuse cases.

The next two chapters include studies on platform mergers, focusing on vertical and conglomerate mergers, which are receiving increasing attention as they are actively used to form platform ecosystems and diversify businesses. Chapter 3 analyzes how to consider the potential for self-preferencing by platforms in the merger review process. Self-preferencing is possible only when a platform has a dual role, securing its own or affiliated firms that compete with its business users, and non-horizontal mergers are a primary means of acquiring this dual position. Based on literature reviews and theoretical analysis, this chapter identifies considerations for non-horizontal merger reviews related to self-preferencing. Lastly, Chapter 4 investigates the formation and reinforcement of entry barriers due to platform mergers. Through theoretical analysis and reviews of past cases, this chapter provides recommendations for effectively evaluating entry barrier issues in merger reviews.

The collective conclusions can be summarized in two points. Firstly, competition policy reform should fully reflect the unique characteristics of digital platforms. The analysis of their typical unilateral conduct and mergers indicates that their economic effects and pathways are not fundamentally different from those of traditional companies. However, the distinct features of digital platforms can lead to new or multiple forms of anti-competitive behavior, make certain actions more pronounced or severe, and heighten the complexity and technical challenges in analyzing and judging their anti-competitive effects.

Secondly, caution is needed when introducing or strengthening antitrust regulations that extend beyond existing legal frameworks. This report emphasizes the importance of better market monitoring and industry-led discussions on active regulatory intervention on platform fees. For self-preferencing and platform mergers, it highlights the value of case-by-case reviews with assessment criteria for effectiveness. Without sufficient consideration for the dynamism of the digital market, where rapid technological change and innovation lead to emerging business models and blurred market boundaries, regulations mayend up hindering innovation incentives, ultimately hurting competition in the long run. Digital platform competition policy should achieve a delicate balance between reducing the harms of monopolies and protecting the incentives for innovation and healthy competition. At present, a flexible response approach to competition law is deemed necessary, tailored to the specific context of each case, while enhancing enforcement through improved timeliness and effectiveness.

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