Economic preferences underpin saving, insurance, and cooperative behavior, and pension, tax, and financial policies implicitly presuppose a particular distribution of them. To our knowledge, no Korean dataset has measured time discounting, risk attitudes, and reciprocity jointly for the same respondents. Using the 2025 KDI Survey on Public Attitudes toward Economic Preferences (N=1,628), this study estimates the determinants of all three domains and reads the resulting patterns against a contrast between a strategic mechanism―adaptation to objective conditions―and a normative mechanism―the operation of social role identity.

Three findings emerge. First, the determinants of time discounting diverge by horizon: the five-year rate responds to objective resource conditions such as income, debt, and age, while at the one-year horizon the marginal explanatory power of income and debt weakens and variables of self-regulation and identity―the form of saving held and social role―take their place. Second, risk attitudes are governed by gender, education, income, and financial literacy, with social role variables adding no significant explanatory power. Third, allocation-game responses cluster at the equal split, and the share of respondents answering identically rises monotonically with education, making it difficult to read this clustering as an expression of reciprocity preference alone.

The policy implication lies in matching behavioral mechanisms to policy instruments. For long-horizon discounting and risk attitudes, the evidence points to altering objective conditions―income stability, asset accumulation, and relief of debt burdens. The study's contribution is to document that determinant patterns differ systematically across the three domains and to make that difference usable in the choice of policy instruments.

Abstract (ENG)
Preface
Summary (KOR)

Chapter 1 Introduction
　Section 1. Background and Problem Statement
　Section 2. Analytical Framework and Data

Chapter 2 Theoretical Background
　Section 1. Challenges to the Assumption of Exogenous Preferences
　Section 2. Theoretical Framework of the Two Mechanisms
　Section 3. Theoretical Examination on Determinants of Time Discounting
　Section 4. Theoretical Examination on Determinants of Risk Attitudes
　Section 5. Theoretical Examination on Reciprocity and Resource Allocation Games
　Section 6. Overview of Empirical Analysis

Chapter 3 Data and Measurement
　Section 1. Issues in Preference Measurement
　Section 2. Data Sources and Sample Design
　Section 3. Behavioral Measurement: Staircase Comparison Survey
　Section 4. Significance of Self-Reported Measures
　Section 5. Reciprocity Measurement: Surveying Resource Allocation Games
　Section 6. Overview of Analytical Methodology

Chapter 4 Determinants of Time Discounting and Risk Attitudes
　Section 1. Analysis Data and Regression Specifications
　Section 2. Determinants of Time Discounting
　Section 3. Determinants of Risk Attitudes
　Section 4. Comparison of Determinant Patterns Across Two Domains

Chapter 5 Response Patterns and Analysis of Resource Allocation Games
　Section 1. Theoretical Background and Measurement Environment of Resource Allocation Games
　Section 2. Diagnosis of Response Distributions
　Section 3. Determinants of Deviation from Equal Split
　Section 4. Within-Subject Difference Analysis: Determinants of UG-DG Differences

Chapter 6 Policy Implications and Conclusion
　Section 1. Synthesis of Analytical Results
　Section 2. Theoretical Status of Strategic and Normative Mechanisms
　Section 3. Policy Implications: Alignment Between Mechanisms and Means
　Section 4. Policy Infrastructure for Reciprocity Measurement
　Section 5. Limitations of Data and Design
　Section 6. Conclusion

References
Appendix