KDI - Korea Development Institute - RESEARCH - Research Areas

Summary

Other Research KOR Aid for Trade: Global Trends, Cases, and Implementation Framework

This study analyzes global trends and shifting policy agendas in Aid for Trade (AfT) and compares the AfT implementation systems of major donor countries, including the Republic of Korea, to draw policy implications for improving Korea's AfT policy.

AfT currently faces a challenging funding environment. Total Official Development Assistance (ODA) from members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) fell by 23.1 percent year-on-year in 2025 to USD 174.3 billion, marking the sharpest decline on record. This decrease was driven by simultaneous cuts from the five largest donors, namely the United States, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan, with the United States alone recording a 56.9 percent reduction. This decline in development finance is also expected to have a significant impact on Aid for Trade (AfT), although responses vary across donor countries. While European donors have reduced both the share of AfT within ODA and its absolute volume, Japan has instead expanded both its AfT share and overall commitments, maintaining its position as the largest AfT donor since 2022.

Globally, AfT continues to center on economic infrastructure and productive capacity building―accounting for 56.7 percent and 40.6 percent of total AfT in 2024, respectively―while its policy agenda has steadily broadened from global value chain participation and regional trade integration (2011-2015) to the
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and climate action (2016-) and supply chain resilience and digital trade (2021-). Korea's AfT expenditure nearly doubled from USD 0.58 billion in 2015 to USD 1.12 billion in 2024, ranking among the top seven donors, with an AfT share of ODA (about 31 percent) exceeding the global share of 18.1 percent. However, Korea's portfolio remains disproportionately concentrated in economic infrastructure (68.9 percent, above the global share of 56.7 percent), while trade policy and regulation support accounts for only 0.9 percent. Meanwhile, its digital economy and innovation share has grown rapidly, from 8.2 percent in 2015 to 23.4 percent in 2024, the highest share among major comparator donors.

A comparative analysis of Japan, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Australia identifies common features across policy, governance, financing, and performance management: these donors explicitly reference AfT (or trade-development linkages) in top-level policy documents, institutionalize consultation channels between development and trade authorities, and separately manage, brand, and communicate AfT outcomes through international platforms such as the AfT Global Review. Japan, in particular, coordinates across different ministries through Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), an integrated grant-and-loan implementing agency, and a cabinet-level coordination council, explicitly linking economic security and supply chain connectivity to its development cooperation charter.

Benchmarked against these cases, Korea's AfT implementation system reveals clear gaps in policy strategy, governance, and performance management. No single authority is responsible for AfT planning and inter-ministerial coordination―a structural consequence of the bifurcation between grant aid (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and concessional loans (Ministry of Economy and Finance), as well as the presence of a separate trade ministry (Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources). As a result, Korea's AfT achievements remain scattered across individual ministry reports and are undervalued both domestically and internationally, while its participation in the AfT Global Review has been limited to survey-level monitoring and evaluation reporting.

This study argues that Korea's AfT challenge lies not in a lack of resources or performance, but in how AfT is recognized and institutionally designed: Korea already possesses proven achievements―such as the export of the UNI-PASS customs system to seven African countries and Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)'s smart farm projects―that have yet to be integrated into a coherent AfT policy framework. This governance gap also entails a strategic opportunity cost, as emerging AfT agendas in which Korea holds comparative advantages―supply chain security and critical minerals, digital trade rules, and climate-trade linkages―are being shaped by other donors while Korea remains largely absent from the discussion.

The study proposes five institutional tasks for building a Korean AfT implementation system: (1) establishing a cross-cutting integrated policy framework by reclassifying AfT-relevant content scattered across regional and sectoral strategies; (2) formalizing governance through official consultation channels among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources, KOICA, and the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF); (3) developing verified achievements such as UNI-PASS and smart farm projects into impact stories and elevating Korea's engagement in the AfT Global Review to the level of session hosting; (4) building an integrated performance management system to consolidate and report AfT outcomes across ministries; and (5) proactively engaging in the formation of emerging trade-development agendas through the WTO Committee on Trade and Development and the AfT Global Review. The 10th AfT Global Review, to be held in Geneva in October 2026 to mark the 20th anniversary of the AfT Initiative, represents the nearest opportunity for Korea to demonstrate progress on these tasks.

Ultimately, building an AfT implementation system is not merely a matter of improving aid efficiency and effectiveness. It is about positioning AfT as a policy instrument linked to Korea's trade and economic diplomacy strategy, and laying the groundwork for Korea to serve as a norm-setter amid the ongoing reshaping of the global geoeconomic order.

Summary

Other Research KOR Evaluating the Effectiveness of Korea’s Materials, Parts, and Equipment (MPE) Policy

This study evaluates the effectiveness of Korea’s first Materials, Parts, and Equipment (MPE) Competitiveness Enhancement Plan (2021-2025) and draws policy implications for supply chain diversification and resilience. Following export restrictions imposed by Japan in 2019 and the growing fragmentation of global supply chains, Korea elevated MPE policy from a conventional industrial competitiveness strategy to a key pillar of economic security. Against this backdrop, the study examines both structural changes in the MPE sector and the performance effects of major policy instruments.

Using industry-level and firm-level data, the study analyzes changes in domestic production, value-added, trade structure, and corporate performance before and after policy implementation. At the industry level, self-sufficiency ratios, import penetration ratios, and trade diversification indicators are employed to assess structural changes in production and trade. At the firm level, the impacts of three major policy measures―R&D support, designation as a National Champion Firm, and participation in specialized industrial complexes―are evaluated using propensity score matching (PSM) and difference-in-differences (DID) methods.

The empirical findings reveal notable shifts in Korea's MPE trade structure: import dependence on Japan declined, while import dependence on China increased and exports to China contracted. In particular, the analysis demonstrates that deepening import dependence on China exerts a negative effect on domestic production, whereas exports to China contribute positively to domestic output―underscoring China's dual role as both a critical upstream supplier and a key downstream export market within Korea's MPE value chain.

Firm-level analysis indicates that R&D support is the most effective policy instrument, generating positive effects on profitability, innovation, and productivity. National Champion Firm designation strengthens innovation capacity, while participation in specialized industrial complexes contributes to financial stability in the early stages. Moreover, policy packages combining R&D support with National Champion Firm designation produce considerably stronger outcomes than either instrument alone, pointing to significant complementarities across policy instruments. In contrast, policy combinations without R&D support exhibit weaker innovation and profitability outcomes.

Based on these findings, the study argues that Korea’s MPE policy should evolve from fragmented project-based support toward an integrated, R&D-centered policy package spanning the entire innovation cycle. It also highlights the need to strengthen long-term technological capabilities, develop ecosystem-based industrial clusters, and shift policy objectives from import substitution toward strategic indispensability and supply chain resilience within global value chains.

These findings should be interpreted with caution. The firm-level analysis compares treated and untreated firms and cannot fully rule out the influence of unobserved firm characteristics; moreover, a uniform treatment-timing assumption (2019 for R&D, and 2020 for National Champion Firm designation and specialized industrial complexes) may not fully capture firm-specific variation in the timing of policy benefits. The results should therefore not be interpreted as a definitive assessment of the overall success or failure of Korea's MPE policy. Further research―incorporating firm-specific treatment timing, longer time series, and complementary qualitative evidence―is needed to validate and refine these findings.

Summary

Research Monograph KOR Cultivating and Scaling Innovative Firms: Strategies for Creating New Growth Engine in Korea

Scale-up firms play a pivotal role in injecting new vitality into the economy and enhancing national competitiveness. Given the stagnant growth potential, it is increasingly important to create an ecosystem optimized for scale-up firms to grow and to establish an environment where high-growth firms can continuously emerge. However, in reality, many firms in Korea face various barriers during the scale-up process, including difficulties in securing skilled talent, utilizing digital tools, and expanding into global markets.

In response, this study examines whether Korea’s business ecosystem provides an environment where innovative and competitive firms can continuously grow beyond the domestic market into the global market. And by focusing on areas where such an environment is insufficiently provided, it presents policy directions and implementation strategies for transitioning to a more desirable ecosystem.

Consisting of four main chapters, the study emphasizes the following policy suggestions. First, as the decline in the proportion of high-growth firms weakens economic dynamism and job creation, the government must shift toward scale-up policies and establish an integrated management system to support these firms. Second, to enhance the global competitiveness of startups, it is essential to introduce a specialized visa focusing on innovation and growth potential, streamline permanent residency pathways, and expand tax benefits. Third, to encourage firms to pursue sustained growth in export markets, it is necessary to design export promotion programs that are performance-based and tied to their success in export markets. Fourth, revitalizing industry-academia-research collaboration requires a demand-driven policy approach, increased participation from large and mid-sized firms, patent box incentives, and strengthened industry linkages with public research institutes.

Summary

KDI FOCUS Korea’s Trade Structure since 2010 and Implications for Economic Security

Recent shifts in Korea’s trade structure are characterized by a broad-based rise in imports from China and a concentrated expansion of exports to the United States in a small set of products, resulting in deeper bilateral trade dependence with both economies. These structural shifts introduce multiple risks, including supply chain vulnerability, job losses in sectors competing with Chinese imports, exposure to U.S. protectionism, and macroeconomic instability. Proactive trade diversification through coordinated policies and targeted export promotion initiatives is essential, alongside institutional reforms to shield affected industries and workers. This agenda should remain a policy priority even after the current trade negotiations with the U.S. are concluded.

- Responses to U.S. tariffs dominate attention while Korea’s shifting trading structure remains overlooked.

- Korea’s recent trade features a shift to a deficit with China, a growing surplus with the U.S., and rising dependence on both.

- Korea’s trade balance deterioration with China stems from net import growth in broad manufactured products, while its U.S. trade surplus expansion is driven by exports of a few products, including automobiles and semiconductors.

- Korea’s import and export shifts have elevated its country-level import concentration and product-level export concentration above other major economies.

- Technological, industrial, and policy shifts of the U.S. and China, alongside their escalating geopolitical tensions, continue to shape Korea’s trade patterns.

- Rising supply chain dependence on China poses the risk of negative spillover effects not only on Korea’s current key industries but also on future strategic ones.

- Intensified competition from Chinese imports raises concerns about employment declines and deteriorating job quality in Korea’s manufacturing sectors.

- Korea’s export growth to the U.S., concentrated in a few products, increases the likelihood of becoming the target of U.S. tariff measures.

- Deepening trade dependence on a few countries and products may increase macroeconomic instability.

- Export and import diversification calls for stronger national economic diplomacy and trade cooperation, alongside accelerated CPTPP accession.

- Expanded support is needed for export and import firms to diversify trading partners and product portfolios, prioritizing policies with proven effectiveness.

- Protecting domestic industries calls for stronger monitoring and response systems for unfair trade practices, alongside assistance that helps affected firms and workers adapt swiftly to the changes.

Summary

Policy Study KOR Impact of Global Trade Fragmentation on South Korea’s Exports: The U.S-China Trade War and Policy Insights

This study analyzes the effects of the U.S.-China trade war on third-country exports to the U.S. and China, focusing on South Korea. Using tariff change data that occurred during the 2018~19 US-China trade war, it estimates product-level elasticities of substitution, i.e., tariff cross-elasticities, and investigates their determinants across countries, industries, and products. This analysis elucidates the heterogeneous effects of the trade war, informing policies to seize new export opportunities amid ongoing global trade fragmentation.

The results show that Korea’s tariff cross-elasticities toward the U.S., relative to U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports, were generally positive, implying that higher U.S. tariffs tend to boost Korean exports to the U.S. In contrast, the elasticity toward China, relative to Chinese tariffs on U.S. imports, was negative on average, suggesting that increased Chinese tariffs tend to reduce Korea’s exports to China. Comparing predicted and actual export changes reveals a potential underestimation bias in the regression model.

Decomposing the determinants of tariff cross-elasticities into country, industry, and product factors reveals the significance of country-specific elements for exports to the U.S. and China, with industry factors also exhibiting relevance for exports to the U.S. In the case of Korea, tariff elasticities were higher in high-tech, capital-intensive, or export-integrated industries.

Additionally, analysis of Korean manufacturing shows that industries with economies of scale reduced production costs and expanded output during the trade war. Zooming into factors for economies of scale, capital-intensive industries with prior investments saw increased value-added, expanded investment, and lower costs. Export-integrated industries exhibited similar positive outcomes.

Lastly, simulations based on the estimated elasticities project that four U.S.-China tariff scenarios increase Korea’s exports to the U.S. by 0.1% to 7.0%, depending on the extent of U.S. tariff changes on Chinese imports. In a severe scenario where both countries impose roughly 10%p additional tariffs on all bilateral imports, Korea's exports are projected to rise by about 4.7% to the U.S. and 9.1% to China.

These findings inform policy decisions for Korea to navigate global trade changes, such as the U.S.-China trade war, by prioritizing targeted support for high-tech and capital-intensive industries and bolstering investment and export infrastructure to enhance resilience and capture emerging export opportunities.

Summary

Research Monograph KOR Digital Transformation Strategy for Digital-Based Growth

COVID-19 has caused many changes socially and economically. While closing their workplaces and stopping face-to-face meetings, companies expanded non-face-to-face activities such as working from home, webinar. In addition, consumers switched activities such as education, daily necessities purchase, food delivery, and fitness to online or mobile methods. COVID-19 caused a rapid change in the existing supply and demand system, and the changed pattern of economic activity is more likely to continue in the future.

The rapid transformation of lifestyle in the global pandemic situation was possible thanks to digital technology that has continued to develop over the past 30 years since the spread of the Internet in the 1990s. Digital technology has become a general-purpose technology that causes fundamental changes in economic, industrial, and social environment, including education, jobs, and lifestyles, beyond the level of limited use for specific products or services.

In particular, digital technology has undergone a rapid commercialization due to the expansion of infrastructure for high-speed transmission and computation of large amounts of data, the emergence of data-based applications, and the simultaneous development of hardware technology. The demand for digital technology has soared due to COVID-19, and it has emerged at the forefront of our society.

This phenomenon, also called digital transformation, is felt as a rapid and overall change in society. However, Companies has been feeing the impact of digital transformation before Covid-19. Advances in digital technologies such as the Internet of Things, Cloud, Big Data, and Mobile have provided companies with opportunities to innovate through new business models, while causing fundamental changes in the way companies work.

Digital transformation is expected to be positive for productivity improvement and economic growth by promoting the emergence of new products and services and enhancing work efficiency. In addition, digital transformation will promote the expansion of digital trade, thereby expanding export opportunities for products and services through digital. On the other hand, while the risk of cyber security is expected to increase due to high dependence on digital technology, there are also concerns that automation and digitalization of work may have a negative impact on employment.

Accordingly, this study examines tasks for digital transformation and policy directions for stable transition to a digital society in six dimensions: corporate, government policy, regulation, job, education, and global environment.

Chapter 1 identifies the key elements and expected effects of a company's digital transformation, and presents the patterns and levels of digital transformation of domestic companies. Chapter 2 examines policy challenges for digital transformation of SMEs so that SMEs can grow into small and medium-sized enterprises by using digital to increase productivity and strengthening innovation capabilities. Chapter 3 preemptively examines all problems related to the emergence of new industries using digital technology to seek ways to improve regulations that help the smooth growth of new industries. Chapter 4 quantitatively analyzes whether industrial robots, a specific form of automation, replace domestic jobs. Chapter 5 discusses the transition to digital education using artificial intelligence and its tasks as an alternative to solving the problems of our public education. Chapter 6 analyzes the current situation centering on digital trade, a new economic opportunity in the digital era, and examines recent trade issues.

This report summarizes the policy directions that can minimize the side effects that may be caused by digital tansformation while using digital transformation as a stepping stone for the growth of the Korean economy.

First of all, in order to produce a good performance for digital transformation of domestic SMEs, it is necessary to diagnose the readiness of SMEs for digital transformation and provide necessary policy support to SMEs while conducting consulting on what digital technologies and capabilities to be equipped with. In addition, policy integration and coordination is needed so that the government's various digital transformation policies for SMEs can be linked to each other.

Second, it is necessary to clarify regulations in order to harmonize newly emerging technologies and industries with the existing system in the process of transition to a digital society. Regulatory reform has been recognized as deregulation, but the current rapid digitization requires clarification of regulations, preemptive modification and timely provision of regulations, and advancement of regulatory quality.

Third, the trend of robot increase is expected to continue due to continuous digital transformation and industrial structure reorganization, so it is necessary to protect the vulnerable, centering on mid-skilled jobs in the manufacturing industry. It is necessary to expand vocational education so that workers can move smoothly to areas where labor demand is expanding, and to help higher education acquire robot utilization skills and complementary skills.

Fourth, the educational gap should be narrowed by using artificial intelligence. It is analyzed that non-face-to-face education due to COVID-19 has decreased academic ability and widened the educational gap. In order to solve this problem, policy efforts to improve the quality of education, such as strengthening learning feedback, spreading customized education at each student level, and introducing a continuous academic diagnosis system, are considered to be feasible through transition to digital education using artificial intelligence.

Finally, in order to expand the market through digital trade, digital trade statistics should be advanced, digital trade agreements should be expanded, systems should be established to preemptively respond to overseas data regulations, and support measures should be prepared to resolve digital trade disputes for SMEs.

Summary

Policy Study KOR Offshoring vs. Reshoring: Trend, Drivers, and Policy Implications

The discussion on the side effects of offshoring and reshoring has gained momentum since the 2010s, leading to an increasing need for related research. This study analyzed 1,200 multinational corporations in South Korea from 2008 to 2019, classifying their investment types into four categories: (i) expansion with investments in both domestic and foreign markets (expander), (ii) offshoring with reduced or withheld investments domestically while investing abroad (offshorer), (iii) reshoring with reduced or withheld investments abroad while investing domestically (reshorer), and (iv) retention or downsizing with reduced or withheld investments in both domestic and foreign markets (idler). The study examined the characteristics of firms for each investment type, factors influencing investment type decisions, and the overall investment trends.

During the sample period, the overall trends of the four investment types remained relatively stable and evenly distributed. Offshorers and reshorers accounted for approximately 20% and 24% respectively. Moreover, around 40% of reshorers repeated the same investment strategy in the following years, indicating persistence in their decision-making.

Reshorers experienced short-term growth in revenue and employment, but their productivity growth rate was the lowest. Additionally, their activities in the foreign market, such as exports and imports, also decreased. This suggests a high likelihood that the observed short-term growth may not be sustainable. On the other hand, offshorers had a faster growth rate in productivity but had a negative impact on domestic employment. Offshoring and reshoring were thus economically conflicting.

The analysis of factors influencing investment type decisions revealed that expanders showed significantly higher numbers in size, productivity, and R&D investment compared to other investment types. Following expander, offshorer, reshorer, and idler exhibited lower levels of productivity in that order, highlighting the importance of productivity in investment type decisions. Reshorers had relatively high labor intensity, limited experience in overseas production activities, and their investment destination country was closer to South Korea. This suggests that firms with lower fixed costs of foreign investment and less burden in returning to the domestic market tend to choose reshoring as their primary option.

Reshoring policies have gained popularity in major advanced countries due to reasons such as national security, supply chain stability, and promotion of domestic employment. South Korea is also pursuing related policies. However, considering the characteristics of firms engaging in reshoring, it is desirable for the policy to aim at assisting reshoring firms in increasing productivity and eventually transitioning into expansionary investment firms, rather than focusing solely on reshoring itself.

Summary

Policy Study KOR Impact of International Trade on Firm’s Innovation and Business Portfolio

This study empirically analyzes how international trade affects the technological innovation of domestic incumbent firms. While international trade is divided into exports and imports, the research focuses on whether it increases the innovation incentives of local firms or instead reduces the incentives for innovation when competition between imports and domestic products intensifies in the domestic market. According to the literature, it is relatively well established that expansion of export markets promotes innovation activities of domestic firms, but the effects of import competition are shown differently among the analyzed countries. This calls for a specific investigation of the Korean case.

The firm-level intensity of innovation is measured through the number of patent applications per employee, representing that the more patents are applied by a firm, the more innovative it is. Next, this study divides import competition into two country groups: one from developed countries and the other from developing countries. The relationship between the level of import competition for each group and the intensity of innovation activities is then investigated.

The analysis finds that Korean firms' innovation activities are significantly affected by the competition between the two groups. Specifically, the import competition from developing countries is shown to promote domestic innovation, but innovation from developed countries tends to reduce innovation incentives. This result unveils two different motives (i.e., escape-competition incentive and Schumpeterian force) that exist between market competition and innovation and thereby supports Aghion et al. (2005, 2009). In particular, firms that have little technological gap with imports from developing countries, including China, are found to be the most sensitive to competition with developing countries, showing that the escape-competition incentive is working well. In other words, firms are responding to import competition according to market mechanisms in Korea.

The findings have important implications for policy-making. Import competition from developed countries occurs mainly high-tech and high- value-added industries that our economy is aiming for. In these industries, market competition has made it difficult for domestic firms to step up as leaders by weakening their innovation incentives. This implies that appropriate government support is necessary, at least concerning technological innovation. Of course, further research is needed specifically on which supporting policies are the most appropriate. However, at least it would be desirable that the government support should be provided in a way that encourages corporate innovation incentives without distorting competition in the market.

Summary

KDI FOCUS China’s Structural Change and the Impact on Korea’s Industrial Growth

□ Until 2014, demand for durable goods was at the heart of China’s domestic market growth. This, combined with the expansion of global value chains(GVC), contributed significantly to the rise of Korea’s key industries, particularly that of heavy and chemical products, including electrical and electronic devices. Today, however, China faces two concurrent challenges, a slowdown in growth and a structural shift in domestic demand to services. As a result, a considerably large impact will likely be felt across the Korean heavy and chemical industries, the biggest beneficiaries of the rapid increase in China’s domestic demand. Under the circumstances, Korea’s policy makers and industrial entities need to enhance their understanding of the changes in the Chinese economy and develop preemptive countermeasures by reforming existing business structures. Additionally, researchers must provide more in-depth studies on China’s evolving domestic market.

- The rapid expansion in China’s domestic market was led by the demand for durable goods until 2014.

- China’s durable goods-led growth in the domestic market combined with the expansion of GVCs has contributed significantly to the growth of the Korean economy.

- Korea’s heavy and chemical industries were the biggest beneficiaries.

- However, China is currently faced with two concurrent challenges, slowdown in growth and changes in its industrial structure, which are also occurring in the domestic market.

- In fact, the shift in China’s domestic demand towards services is a natural phenomenon given its current economic structure and income level.

- China’s slow growth and the structural shift in domestic demand will deal a heavy blow to Korea’s key industries, whose growth has been largely attributed to China’s strong demand.

- If the series of recent events in China are regarded as an integral part of the shift in the industrial structure, it would be possible to predict the direction of China’s changes.

- Korea’s industries must be aware of the changes in the Chinese economy and develop countermeasures that include reforming business structures.

- Simultaneously, more in-depth studies are needed on the changes in China’s domestic market.

※ Written based on Chung, Sunghoon, “Global Value Chains and Impacts of China’s Structural Changes,” in Kyungsoo Choi (ed.), Structural Changes of the Chinese Economy and New Opportunities for Korea, Chapter 2, Research Monograph 2015-09, Korea Development Institute, 2015 (in Korean). (*The full text of Research Monograph will be released later on.)

Summary

KDI FOCUS China’s Stronger Enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law and Korea’s Response

□ Tougher enforcement of the anti-monopoly law in China is expected to open markets and bolster the competition environment. In response, Korean companies must make efforts to take full advantage these changes to expand their business into the Chinese market while avoiding the risk of violating the stricter laws.

- China’s enactment of the anti-monopoly law is considered a leap forward towards a market economy.

- China adopted a market economy, but still emphasizes the role of government.

- China’s market structure is highly competitive although there exists institutional imperfections that disturb the efficiency of market functions.

- Anti-monopoly law, price law and anti-unfair competition law constitute China’s competition laws.

- China’s anti-monopoly law is a medium through which to develop a socialist market economy.

- China’s anti-monopoly law corresponds to global standards but “impartiality” has become the highest legal purpose and the basis for illegality.

- China has shown strong willingness to correct administrative monopolistic practices, but the institutional mechanisms to make this happen are not yet properly established.

- Illegal practices are subject to severe sanctions; Qualcomm was fined approximately RMB 6 billion (1.37 trillion won).

- China has actively applied its anti-monopoly law to cases of international cartels and business combinations with foreign - companies.

- It has been pointed out that China’s law enforcement has problems including lack of independence, forced investigations and excessive discretionary power.

- China will likely further strengthen the enforcement of the anti-monopoly law.

- China’s stricter antimonopoly law must be viewed positively and Korea should actively work to adapt.

- China’s anti-monopoly law considers excessively high prices to be a violation, and business combinations are reviewed based on industrial policy considerations.

- In the long-term, stricter enforcement will provide more opportunities for Korean companies as it increases openness and transparency and removes competition-restricting regulations in the Chinese market.

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